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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Attorneys' fees may be awarded to prevailing parties in 
actions brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 ("ERISA").  The statute, however, provides no standard 
for a fee award, stating only that "the court in its discretion 
may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action."  29 
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).  To guide district courts as they exercise 
their discretion in connection with such fee applications, we 
have set forth five factors that must be considered: 
  (1) the offending parties' culpability 
or bad faith; 
 
  (2) the ability of the offending parties 
to satisfy an award of attorneys' fees; 
 
  (3) the deterrent effect of an award of 
attorneys' fees against the offending 
parties; 
 
  (4) the benefit conferred on members of 
the pension plan as a whole; and 
 
  (5) the relative merits of the parties' 
position. 
 
Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983).1  We 
have further instructed that there is no presumption that a 
successful plaintiff in an ERISA suit should receive an award in 
the absence of exceptional circumstances.  Ellison v. Shenango, 
Inc. Pension Bd., 956 F.2d 1268, 1273 (3d Cir. 1992).   Finally, 
we have directed that a district court, when ruling on an 
application for attorneys' fees in an ERISA case, should 
articulate its analysis and conclusions as it considers each of 
the five Ursic factors.  See Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating 
Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1012 (3d Cir. 1992).  This appeal requires 
us to further discuss the standard for awarding attorneys' fees 
in ERISA cases. 
 
 I. 
 American Re-Insurance Company ("the Company") fired its 
comptroller, Paul F. McPherson, on July 29, 1983.  McPherson's 
last day of work was August 12, 1983, although his salary and 
benefits continued through February 16, 1984.  McPherson 
attributes his dismissal to personal differences with two senior 
executives. 
 McPherson had worked at the Company since 1959 and was 
a vested participant in the Employees' Pension Plan of American 
                     
1
.  See also Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 
999, 1011 (3d Cir. 1992); Schake v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. 
Severance Plan, 960 F.2d 1187, 1193 (3d Cir. 1992); Bell v. 
United Princeton Properties, Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 724-25 (3d Cir. 
1989); Monkelis v. Mobay Chemical, 827 F.2d 935, 936 (3d Cir. 
1987); Groves v. Modified Retirement Plan, 803 F.2d 109, 119-20 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
Re-Insurance Company ("the Plan"), a single-employer defined-
benefit plan, which was qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 401(a).  
McPherson had various options for receiving his Plan benefits, 
among which was a lump-sum distribution of $182,837 when he 
turned 55 on January 8, 1987.  Lump-sum distributions needed the 
approval of the Pension Committee of Employees' Pension Plan 
("the Committee"), which was required by § 6.4 of the Plan to 
evaluate requests in "a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner." 
 McPherson wrote a letter to a member of the Committee 
in October 1986, in which he asked whether "the lump sum option 
is available to me."  McPherson was told in a letter dated 
November 5, 1986, that "a lump sum is available to eligible 
participants" and that "[e]ligibility includes proof of good 
health, financial stability, etc."  McPherson wrote back on 
December 11, 1986, offering to provide any necessary information.  
A Committee member sent a letter to McPherson on December 29, 
1986, which specified the proof of health and financial stability 
that the Committee would require, but cautioned "that a lump sum 
benefit has never been granted to anyone under the age of sixty-
two."  McPherson submitted the requested documentation to the 
Committee on January 19, 1987.     
 McPherson's request to the Committee for a lump-sum 
distribution was the tenth since 1974; the Committee had approved 
the nine others.  In considering the nine previous requests for 
lump-sum distributions, the Committee had sometimes looked to two 
criteria:  good health and financial stability on the part of the 
applicant.  The good health requirement was said to be designed 
to prevent a selection pattern that might undermine the financial 
stability of the Plan -- a pattern in which terminally ill 
participants would request distributions on their deathbeds while 
healthy participants would not request distributions and continue 
to receive benefits throughout their lengthy retirements.  The 
financial stability requirement aimed to ensure that 
beneficiaries had sufficient sophistication to manage a lump-sum 
distribution. 
 The Committee informed McPherson in a letter dated 
April 10, 1987, that it had denied his request for a lump-sum 
distribution.  The Committee explained that "lump sum benefits 
will only be granted to those qualified participants at the time 
of retirement from active employment," and McPherson was thus 
ineligible because he still held the job that he had taken after 
the Company fired him in 1983. 
 McPherson renewed his request for a lump-sum 
distribution on June 29, 1990.  The Committee denied his request 
on October 23, 1990, saying that lump-sum distributions were 
available only to employees who retired directly from the Company 
when they were older than 55.   
 McPherson brought suit in district court under ERISA 
against the Plan and the Committee to obtain a lump-sum 
distribution on December 18, 1990, and was granted summary 
judgment on October 16, 1992.  The district court concluded that 
the denial of McPherson's request for a lump-sum distribution was 
"arbitrary and capricious" and not "supported by a rational 
explanation."  As the district court later wrote: 
  [D]efendants. . . provided [the court 
with] essentially three reasons for the 
Committee's decision denying . . . plaintiff 
from receiving lump sum benefit payments       
. . . :  (1) the potentially destabilizing 
effect on Plan assets; (2) . . . allowing 
more employees to receive lump sums would 
undermine the Plan's investment strategy; and 
(3) . . . allowing "non-retiring" employees 
to receive their benefits in lump sums would 
contravene the primary purpose of the Plan 
which was to provide post-retirement income. 
 
  Th[is] Court concluded that the 
Committee's concerns regarding the Plan's 
solvency and investment strategy were 
unsupported when viewing the overall size and 
financial soundness of the Plan.  Th[is] 
Court also found that the Committee's goal of 
providing post-retirement income would not be 
undermined by providing lump sum benefits to 
retirement aged participants who had left the 
company earlier in their careers. 
  
 McPherson sought attorney's fees and costs.  After 
setting forth the five Ursic factors, the district court denied 
McPherson's motion with the following comments:   
  There is no indication that the 
Committee acted in bad faith in denying 
plaintiff's lump sum benefit request, thus 
there appears to be no need to deter such 
conduct by defendants.  Although the Court's 
inquiry into the Committee's decision-making 
process revealed that its decision was 
unsupported by the record, that inquiry did 
not reveal any sinister motive which led to 
the Committee's improper determination. 
 
  It also appears that plaintiff's success 
was neither intended to benefit other Plan 
members, nor will it do so in the future.  
Subsequent to plaintiff requesting a lump sum 
benefit, the section of the Plan governing 
lump sum payments was amended, thus (1) 
restricting lump sum payments to employees 
who "retire directly" from the Company . . .; 
and (2) removing the discretion of the 
Committee to approve or reject such requests. 
 
  Furthermore, the Committee's decision, 
made in response to a novel situation, was 
not so clearly lacking in merit to warrant 
the imposition of fees. 
 
  Although it is clear that defendants 
could easily pay plaintiff's attorneys' fees, 
that lone factor does not justify such an 
award. 
 
The district court thus concluded that the sole Ursic factor 
favoring an award was the ability of the defendants to pay; the 
other fours factors counseled against an award. 
 McPherson now appeals.  Subject matter jurisdiction 
exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) and 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  "An award of       
. . . attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff in an ERISA case 
is within the discretion of the district court and may only be 
reversed for abuse of discretion."  Schake v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp. Severance Plan, 960 F.2d 1187, 1190 (3d Cir. 
1992).  "Our review of the legal standards a district court 
applies in the exercise of its discretion is, however, plenary."  
Ellison v. Shenango Inc. Pension Bd., 956 F.2d 1268, 1273 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 
 II. 
 Both McPherson and the Plan agree that the second Ursic 
factor -- "the ability of the offending parties to satisfy an 
award of attorneys' fees" -- favors an award.  As for the fourth 
Ursic factor -- "the benefits conferred on members of the pension 
plan as a whole" -- the district court quite properly regarded 
this factor as weighing against McPherson.  The fourth factor 
requires consideration of the benefit, if any, that is conferred 
on others by the court's judgment.  Before McPherson began his 
lawsuit, the Plan was amended to limit lump-sum distributions to 
participants who retired directly from the Company and to 
eliminate the Committee's discretion to approve or deny lump-sum 
distributions.  McPherson's suit thus held out no possibility of 
benefit to other similarly situated Plan members because there 
were, and would be, no other similarly situated Plan members.   
 
 III. 
 We thus find no fault with respect to the district 
court's application of the second and fourth Ursic factors.  
There is an error of law, however, that infects the remainder of 
the district court's analysis.  As we read the district court's 
comments, they appear to reflect a view that the first, third, 
and fifth factors cannot favor an award in the absence of a 
finding that the defendants have acted with a "sinister motive," 
i.e., that they have acted in "bad faith."  We conclude that this 
view is inconsistent with the analysis contemplated by Ursic and 
that a proper Ursic analysis in this case might result in an 
award to McPherson. 
 The district court concluded that the first Ursic 
factor -- "the offending parties' culpability or bad faith" -- 
did not favor an award of attorneys' fees because "[t]here is no 
indication that the Committee acted in bad faith in denying 
plaintiff's lump sum benefit request."  McPherson insists that 
the district court applied an incorrect legal standard:  under 
Ursic, attorneys' fees may be awarded where there was 
"culpability or bad faith," but the district court only 
considered whether there was bad faith.  We agree. 
 The first Ursic factor favors an award to the 
prevailing party not only in cases involving "bad faith" but in 
other cases as well.  As the district court recognized, bad faith 
normally connotes an ulterior motive or sinister purpose.  Ford 
v. Temple Hosp., 790 F.2d 342, 347 (3d Cir. 1986).  A losing 
party may be culpable, however, without having acted with an 
ulterior motive.  In a civil context, culpable conduct is 
commonly understood to mean conduct that is "blameable; 
censurable; . . . at fault; involving the breach of a legal duty 
or the commission of a fault. . . .  Such conduct normally 
involves something more than simple negligence. . . .  [On the 
other hand, it] implies that the act or conduct spoken of is 
reprehensible or wrong, but not that it involves malice or a 
guilty purpose."  Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).  Thus, 
in Vintilla v. United States Steel Corp. Plan, 642 F. Supp. 295, 
296-97 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987), for example, the court concluded 
with respect to the first Ursic factor:  "While we cannot ascribe 
bad faith to plaintiffs' efforts, we do find certain elements of 
culpability attributable to plaintiffs."  Indeed, this court in 
Groves v. Modified Retirement Plan, Inc., 803 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 
1986), found an award of counsel fees to be appropriate in an 
ERISA case without finding that the defendants had acted with an 
ulterior or sinister purpose.   
 A party is not culpable merely because it has taken a 
position that did not prevail in litigation.  Nevertheless, if 
the district court in this case had asked both whether the 
Committee had acted in bad faith and whether it had acted with 
culpability, we believe it might have concluded that the first 
prong of Ursic favored an award to McPherson.   
 Two members of the Committee testified in depositions 
that they denied McPherson's lump-sum distribution because they 
feared that it would threaten the Plan's financial stability.  If 
this testimony did not reflect bad faith, it at least reflected a 
breach of the Committee's fiduciary duty to remain informed 
concerning the financial condition of the Plan.  The Plan in fact 
was overfunded and easily could have accommodated McPherson's 
request and the requests of others similarly situated.  As the 
district court found: 
 [A]t the end of 1987, the year plaintiff's 
initial request was rejected, the total 
accrued benefits owed to all participants was 
$17,940,000, while the Plan's assets stood at 
$43,782,134.  Indeed, when plaintiff 
submitted his lump sum request during 1987 
his $182,382 benefit amount constituted only 
.53% of the Plan's assets as of the beginning 
of the year.  As for the potential for paying 
other lump sums to similarly situated 
participants, the Plan could have immediately 
paid lump sums to all vested terminated 
participants, whether or not they had reached 
age 55, and used less than one-half of the 
Plan's $2,524,941 of interest and dividend 
income for 1990 or about 2.7% of the Plan's 
assets. 
 
 The Committee also misrepresented to McPherson its past 
experience with applications for lump-sum distributions.  In a 
letter dated December 29, 1986, McPherson was told that "a lump-
sum benefit has never been granted to anyone under the age of 
sixty-two"; the district court found that two plan participants 
had received lump-sum distributions when they were 58.  In a 
letter dated April 10, 1987, McPherson was informed that "lump 
sum benefits will only be granted to those qualified participants 
at the time of retirement from active employment"; in 1984, the 
Committee approved a lump-sum distribution to a participant who 
had left the Company for another job. 
 One Committee member attributed his opposition to 
McPherson's request to the Plan's terms, which he incorrectly 
understood to ban lump-sum distributions to participants who had 
not retired.  Although § 6.2 of the Plan required the Committee 
to evaluate requests for lump-sum distributions in "a uniform and 
nondiscriminatory manner," a Committee member admitted in a 
deposition that the Committee had no written rules on lump-sum 
distributions and sometimes used different criteria to evaluate 
requests for lump-sum distributions.  Three Committee members 
admitted in deposition that they were hostile to all lump-sum 
distributions, despite the Plan's explicit provision for them.  
All but one Committee member who participated in the 1987 
decision to deny McPherson's request did not vote in person or 
send a written proxy, as § 9.2 of the Plan required.  After the 
Committee denied McPherson a lump sum distribution in 1987, it 
failed to inform him of his right to appeal, as 29 U.S.C. § 1133 
required.  All members of the Committee had a fiduciary duty to 
be aware of the provisions of the Plan and to administer it in 
accordance with its terms.      
 Finally, we note that this case does not appear to 
involve a simple lapse of judgment or care on the part of the 
defendants.  McPherson's two requests for lump-sum distributions 
and his lawsuit provided the defendants with repeated 
opportunities over a six year period to formulate and reevaluate 
their position in light of the terms of the Plan and its 
financial condition.  Each opportunity, however, appears to have 
produced nothing more than new rationales for their ultimately 
unsustainable conclusion.  Considerable evidence, then, suggests 
that the defendants may have been guilty of culpable conduct when 
they repeatedly denied McPherson's request for a lump-sum 
distribution.  If so, the first Ursic factor weighs to some 
degree in favor of an award of attorneys' fees.  The weight to be 
given this factor in the overall Ursic analysis will, of course, 
depend on the district court's appraisal of how wrongful any 
culpable conduct was. 
   IV. 
 A similar difficulty exists with the district court's 
analysis of the third Ursic factor -- "the deterrent effect of an 
award of attorneys' fees against the offending party."  The 
district court concluded that "there appears to be no need to 
deter such conduct by the defendants" because "[t]here is no 
indication that the Committee acted in bad faith."  We find this 
reasoning flawed.   
 We believe it will further the objectives of ERISA if 
fee awards are employed to deter behavior that falls short of bad 
faith conduct.  See Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc. Profit 
Sharing Plan, 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1096-97 (W.D.Pa. 1983) (in case 
in which "culpability . . . has been shown," fee award will make 
plan "less likely and not so quick to deny benefits to other 
participants" and thus be "a deterrent factor").  Even if the 
Committee did not act in bad faith, the district court should 
have considered whether it would serve the objectives of ERISA to 
award counsel fees in an effort to deter conduct of the kind in 
which the Committee engaged.   
 The district court's failure to distinguish between 
culpability and bad faith also may have affected its analysis of 
the fifth Ursic factor -- "the relative merits of the parties' 
positions."  The district court opinion can be read to reflect a 
view that the fifth Ursic factor weighs in favor of an award only 
in those situations where the positions taken by the defendants 
in the litigation have been so meritless as to evidence bad 
faith.  As with the first Ursic factor, the fact that the 
defendants' positions have not been sustained does not alone put 
the fifth factor in the column favoring an award.  Nevertheless, 
we believe there will be cases in which the relative merits of 
the positions of the parties will support an award even in the 
absence of bad faith litigating.   
 
 V. 
 We express no opinion as to whether attorneys' fees 
should be awarded to McPherson.  That will be for the district 
court to decide on remand based upon the sound exercise of its 
discretion.  We hold only that the district court used an 
incorrect legal standard to evaluate McPherson's request for  
attorneys' fees.  When analyzing the first Ursic factor, it 
considered only whether the defendants acted in bad faith, not 
whether they acted culpably, and, if so, what was the degree of 
their culpability.  Similar misunderstandings appear to have 
infected the district court's analysis of the deterrent effect of 
an award of attorneys' fees and its evaluation of the relative 
merits of the parties' positions.   
 We will reverse the district court's order denying 
attorneys' fees and costs and will remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.    
